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ARGUMENT

I.

A LAW FIRM THAT RECEIVES MONEY INTO ITS IOLTA ACCOUNT
IS A TRANSFEREE AS DEFINED BY THE UT AH FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT.
A.

ATTORNEY TRUST ACCOUNTS ARE NOT SO DIFFERENT
FROM OTHER TRUSTS THAT THEY DESERVE SPECIAL
TREATMENT.

Defendants argue that an attorney trust account is special and that it ought to be
treated differently than other trusts. This court should reject that argument.
1.

Defendants cite URPC l. l 5(a) for the proposition that an attorney must hold trust
funds separately. UCA §75-7-808 requires trustees to keep trust property separate.

2.

Defendants cite URPC 1.15(d) for the proposition that attorney trust funds are
fully available to the client upon demand. URPC 1.15(d) and (e) when taken
together, stand for the opposite conclusion. That rule requires attorneys to act to
protect the interests of third parties when a third party has an interest in trust funds.

3.

Defendants argue, without citation, that attorney trust funds are fully available
through a writ of garnishment. In this case, it is true that Plaintiffs attempted to
garnish the trust funds after they learned of their existence. Unfortunately, by then
all but about $2,000 had been delivered to other persons or had been earmarked for
attorney fees. Regardless, defendants cite not authority for the proposition that if
funds may be garnished, they are exempt from the UFTA. Such a rule would lead
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~

to absurd results. For example, if money is given to a neighbor to hold, that money
can be garnished. To then hold that such a transfer is not subject to the UFT A is
not supported by the language or purpose of the UFT A.
4.

Defendants argue that because the funds are kept separately and because the
attorney does not earn interest on the funds, this indicates that the funds do not
belong to the attorney and thus the attorney is not a transferee. UCA §75-7-808
requires a trustee to keep trust property separate. UCA §75-7-802(1) requires a

~

trustee to administer a trust "solely in the interests of the beneficiaries." This
means that a trustee cannot collect interest on trust funds but must instead deliver
that interest to the trust.

5.

Defendants do not address how the dominion and control test might apply to other
trusts in Utah. The dominion and control test holds that if the transferee is not free
to invest the assets into lottery tickets or uranium stock, no transfer has occurred.
UCA §75-7-804 requires trustees to "administer the trust as a prudent person ...
the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill and caution." This prohibits a
trustee from investing trust assets in lottery tickets or investing in uranium stock,
unless specifically allowed by the trust documents. Thus, just like attorneys,
trustees are legally prohibited from investing trust assets in lottery tickets or
uranium stock.

2
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Because attorney trust accounts are not so different from typical trusts and because
attorneys owe duties very similar to typical trustees, this court should not carve out a
special rule for attorney trust accounts in respect the UFT A. Instead, this court should
treat attorney trust accounts like other trust accounts.
"no effort of a debtor to hinder or delay his creditors is more severely
condemned than an attempt to place his property where he can enjoy it and
at the same time [adversely effect the rights of his creditors]." 37 AmJur 2d
Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers, §33
The overriding majority of case law confirms this conclusion: A
conveyance of property in trust for the benefit of the grantor has frequently
been held to be invalid, such as where a decedent conveyed property for his
own benefit. ... [I]t is a general rule that an individual cannot create out of
his own property, for his own benefit, a trust for himself and thereby defeat
the lawful claims of his creditors. ; See 37 AmJur 2d Fraudulent
Conveyances and Transfers, §34
A secret reservation or trust in favor of the grantor in a conveyance of
property is a badge of fraud and usually is viewed as being per se fraudulent
and void as to creditors ... If the result of the reservation is to defeat the
rights of creditor, the transaction is illegal regardless of the actual intention
of the parties thereto. In expanding on this concept courts have identified
"illusory transfers" - one which takes back all that it gives-and "colorable
transfers" -where the transfer appears absolute on its face but due to some
secret or tacit understanding between the transferee and transferor it is not
transferred because the parties intended ownership to be retained by the
transferor. See 37 AmJur 2d Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers, §35
(emphasis added).

B.

TREATING ATTORNEYS AS TRANSFEREES WILL NOT PUT
ATTORNEYS IN ETHICAL BINDS

Defendants cite Ethics Opinion 00-04 for the proposition that the law firm owed an

3
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ethical duty to distribute trust funds as instructed by defendants. However, that ethics
opinion makes no such assertion. The opinion clearly states that a third party must have a
vj

"matured legal or equitable claim" for the duties described in Rule 1.15(d) and (e) to
arise. Thus, the issue is whether a creditor has a "matured legal or equitable claim"
against the funds under the UFT A. If so, then the attorney must notify the creditor and

vj

follow the other steps outlined in Rule 1.15, including, keeping the money in trust until
the dispute is resolved.
In this case, the problem started when the defendants testified at a court hearing, in
the presence of their attorneys, that they had no funds in trust, no cash on hand and no
vj

funds in their son's bank account. The debtors later testified that prior to that hearing,
they had given their attorney a check for $50,000 to hold in trust. Under URPC 3.3(a)(3)
and (b) this issue could have easily been resolved if the attorney had disclosed to the court

~

at the time that the attorney was holding a check for $50,000.
Attorneys appear to argue that the money came out of the minor child's bank
account and thus they might have understood that the money belonged to the minor child.
Without any explanation, attorneys then claim that attorneys owed an ethical obligation to
vJ

follow debtor's instructions in regard to this money. The district court judge did not
believe this implausible and self serving testimony and thus granted summary judgment
on the factual issue that the money belonged to the debtors all along. Even if the attorney

4
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had not understood who owned the money at the time of the hearing, the ethical rules
would not only allow, but require, the attorney to correct the false testimony when it was
discovered on a later date. If the attorneys had done so and then held the funds in trust,
pursuant to URPC 1.15 until the court resolved what should be done with the funds, the
attorneys would have no exposure under the UFT A.
Thus, even if this court holds that attorneys who take money into trust accounts
can be transferees, attorneys may still abide by the ethical rules. There is no bind.
Admittedly, there is an inconvenience to attorneys. When attorneys take money
into trust from clients who have unpaid judgments against them, attorneys will be wise to
perform an analysis under the UFT A before disbursing trust funds to third parties.
Defendants argue that attorneys play a vital role when they take settlement funds
into their trust accounts and hold them pending settlement. However, defendants make no
effort to explain why this service is good for the public, creditors or debtors. If attorneys
do not perform this service, debtors will be forced to hold their own funds pending
settlement. This will expose the funds to collection efforts of creditors. This is a good
thing. If a creditor has a judgment against a debtor, the creditor ought to be allowed to use
the tools of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to collect the judgment. Secreting money
away in attorney trust accounts in the hopes of reaching a more favorable settlement does
not serve the interests of justice.

5
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v)

If attorneys do not assist debtors in hiding or laundering funds, it may take away
some ammunition to those who claim that attorney act dishonestly on behalf of their
vJ

clients.
Attorneys also argue that adopting the position advocated by plaintiffs will prevent

vJ

attorneys from representing debtors. This is not true. The UFTA gives debtors the ability
to pay for legal services without treating the payment as a fraudulent transfer.
II.

OTHER ST ATES HA VE NOT ADOPTED THE DOMINION AND
CONTROL TEST

Defendants argue that this court should adopt the dominion and control test based
upon decision from other states. Defendants cite Wohlstein v. Aliezer, 321 S.W.3d 765
vJ

{Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) as support for the proposition that Texas has
adopted the dominion and control test. At best, it could be said that Texas is split on the
issue. The Wohlstein case does cite Newsome v. Charter Bank Colonial, 940 S.W.2d 157
(Tex. App. [14 th Dist.] 1996) which did adopt the dominion and control test. Both of these
cases are from the 14th District.
The Texas 1st District Court of Appeals has not adopted the dominion and control
test, however. In two cases, the 1st District effectively adopted the orbit of a transfer test.
Tel. Equip. Network, Inc. v. TA/Westchase Place, Ltd., 80 S.W. 3d 601 {Tex. App.
Houston [ pt Dist.] 2002); Trigeant Holdings, Ltd. v. Jones, 183 S. W.3d 717, 726 (Tex.

6
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Ct

App. Houston [151 Dist.] 2005). 1
Neither party has found a Supreme Court decision from Texas or any other state
court that has decided this issue. With Texas split, the case of Sun National Bank v. Visci,
A-6045-09Tf, A-03 l 7-10t4 (NJSUP) (unpublished) becomes more important. That case is
a State trial court case that adopted the orbit of the transfer test.
Defendants encourage Utah to adopt the dominion and control test from
bankruptcy courts. UCA §25-6-12 encourages this court to construe the statute to
"effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this
chapter among the states adopting it." With no precedent from other states, the question
then becomes, should Utah adopt the interpretation of a different statute by bankruptcy
courts. This court should not do so.
In re. Harwell, 628 F.3d 1312 (11 th Cir. 20 I 0) the court admitted that the "mere
conduit or control test is a judicial creation that is not based in statutory language, but is
an exception based on the bankruptcy courts' equitable powers." Utah Appellate Courts
ought to interpret the statute through traditional rules of statutory construction and
determine that a transferee is a person to whom a transfer is made.

1

Houston trial courts feed into two separate appellate districts. Regardless, each appellate
district follows its own precedent. In re Coy Reece, 341 S.W. 3d 360, 383-384 (Texas Supreme
Court 2011 ).
7
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III.

UFT A DOES NOT EXCLUDE CONSPIRATOR LIABILITY BY ITS TEXT
Defendants argue that the UFT A excludes conspirator liability by its text but then

·-J

fail to cite or quote any such text. UCA §25-6-11 states that the UFTA does not preempt
other State laws. Therefore, it does not preempt conspirator liability based upon other
law. Defendants argue that because conspiracy is not listed in this section, it is excluded.
In Graves v. North Eastern Services, Inc., 2015 UT 28, ,J53. the court held that the use of
the word "including" prior to a list rendered "the absence of any specific reference ...
inconsequential" because the "term is routinely construed as introducing a non-exclusive,
exemplary list."

vJ

IV.

VIOLATION OF THE UTAH FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT MAY
SERVE AS A PREDICATE ACT TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR CIVIL
CONSPIRACY.
Defendants cite GATX Corp. v. Addington, 879 F. Supp. 2d 633 (E.D. Ky. 2012)

for the proposition that allowing a claim of civil conspiracy would be a "run around" of
the Fraudulent Transfer Act. The GATX court reasoned that because the Kentucky
Fraudulent Transfer Act did not have a clause allowing in personam liability against
anyone, including a transferee, violation of that statute could not serve as a predicate act
for a claim of civil conspiracy. Id. at 650. This reasoning makes sense in that one of the
elements of civil conspiracy is damages as a proximate result thereof. If there are no
damages, there can be no civil conspiracy.

8
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The Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act is different. UCA §25-6-9(2) provides that a
creditor may obtain a judgment against the transferee for the value of the asset
transferred. A judgment for the value of the asset is equivalent to damages. Because the
Utah statute clearly provides for damages, when two or more persons conspire to violate
that statute, the creditor is damaged. Defendants ask this court to strain to find that
because the UFT A does not use the word "damages" a person is not damaged by its
violation. In Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993) the court was asked
to review what damages should be awarded under Utah's RICO statute. While the statute
allowed for the doubling and trebling of damages, the predicate acts referred to in the
statute were criminal violations. The Court held that the damages awardable under the
statute were the amount of damages available to the victim if violation of the criminal
statute had given rise to a civil cause of action. Thus, kickback damages were equal to
fraud damages, damages for receiving stolen property were equal to damages for
conversion, etc. Under the reasoning of Hurst, defendants argument that a remedy under
the UFTA of a judgment equal to the value of the asset transferred is not damages is not
well taken and should be rejected.
Colorado has recognized that a fraudulent transfer may serve as a predicate act for
civil conspiracy. In Double Oak Const., LLC v. Cornerstone Dev. Int'/, LLC, 97 P.2d 140

9
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~

(Colo. App. 2003) the court held that a "tortious act" includes "any conduct other than
breach of contract that constitutes a civil wrong and causes injury or damages." Id. at 147.
Other states agree. Summers v. Hagen, 852 P.2d 1165 (Alaska 1993); McElhanon v. Hing,
~

151 Ariz. 386, 728 P.2d 256 (Ct.App.1985) (a legal wrong will support a conspiracy
claim), affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 151 Ariz. 403, 728 P.2d 273
(1986).; Dalton v. Meister, 71 Wis.2d 504,239 N.W.2d 9 (1976).

~

Defendants argue that a fraudulent transfer claim is essentially a contract claim. In
this case, the underlying judgment sounded in fraud. Timothy v. Keetch, 2011 UT App
104. It does not make sense to tum a tort claim into a contract claim merely because the
judgment debtor engaged in fraudulent transfers.

CONCLUSION
This court should define the term transferee in the UFT A as a person who receives
an asset through a transfer. After adopting that definition, this court should overturn the
trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings.
This court should also hold that violation of the UFTA may serve a predicate act to
~

support a claim for civil conspiracy and then remand this case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with that holding.
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CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to URAP 24(t)(l)(C), the undersigned hereby certifies that, according to
the word processing software used to create this brief, it contains 3,135 words out of a
maximum of 7,000 words.
Dated this 11 th day of September, 2015.
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